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Abstract
Extant research offers conflicting predictions about the effect of pay dispersion on team performance. We collected a
unique dataset from the Italian soccer league to study the effect of intra-firm pay dispersion on team performance, under
different definitions of what constitutes a ‘‘team’’. This peculiarity of our dataset can explain the conflicting evidence.
Indeed, we also find positive, null, and negative effects of pay dispersion on team performance, using the same data but
different definitions of team. Our results show that when the team is considered to consist of only the members who directly
contribute to the outcome, high pay dispersion has a detrimental impact on team performance. Enlarging the definition of
the team causes this effect to disappear or even change direction. Finally, we find that the detrimental effect of pay
dispersion is due to worse individual performance, rather than a reduction of team cooperation.
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Introduction
Does pay dispersion have a positive or negative effect on work
and organizational performance [1–2]? Pay dispersion is a
property of a pay distribution, which is the ‘‘array of compensation
levels paid for differences in work responsibilities, human capital,
or individual performance within a single organization’’ [3]. The
literature presents mixed evidence on the relation between the
level of pay dispersion within an organization and work
performance [4–5]. From one perspective (mainly social psychol-
ogy), pay dispersion is believed to cause perceptions of inequity
and relative deprivation that are detrimental to cooperation [6].
From another perspective (economics), pay dispersion can
motivate employees located near the bottom of the pay-
distribution scale to work harder for a future reward—a higher
salary [7–8] —particularly when the pay dispersion is viewed as
legitimate [9]. Pay dispersion may also be beneficial for attracting
and keeping talent [10] or for avoiding the loss of workers who are
crucial to the firm’s output [11]. To add to the already blurry
picture, some research finds no significant relation between pay
dispersion and work performance [12–14].
In this study we focus on teams because teams are fundamental,
and increasingly common, units of organization [15–18]. Teams
are adopted because of their potential synergies. Thus, ‘‘team
production may expand production possibilities by utilizing
collaborative skills’’ [19]. Research suggests that firms increasingly
organize around teams [20–21]. At the same time, firms also
increasingly differentiate rewards [22], such that the firm-level
dispersion of pay is widening. The two trends may be related, as
smaller organizational units (i.e., teams) are associated with smaller
costs of measuring and, therefore, rewarding input and output
performance [23]. Although pay dispersion may exist between
teams, pay may also be differentiated within teams [24], especially
within top-management [25] and professional sports teams [26].
This raises the issue of the effects of within-team pay dispersion on
team performance.
The empirical evidence concerning the relation between pay
dispersion within teams and performance is mixed and inconclu-
sive. Some studies support the idea that pay dispersion has a
beneficial effect on team performance [27–29]; other studies show
that pay dispersion has a detrimental effect [30–33] further studies
find no significant effect [34–36].
In this study we show that the estimates of the effect of pay
dispersion vary when using different definitions of what constitutes
a team. Pfeffer and Langton [37] note that ‘‘one of the more useful
avenues for research on pay systems may be precisely this task of
determining not which pay scheme is best but, rather, under what
conditions salary dispersion has positive effects and under what
conditions it has negative effects.’’ We provide evidence that the
effect of pay dispersion can be positive, null, or negative depending
on the precision of the definition of team. Our dataset in fact
allows us to measure pay dispersion by distinguishing between
‘‘active’’ and ‘‘passive’’ players. Both are part of the team, but only
the former ones contribute to the team’s performance.
Our dataset is drawn from two seasons of the men’s major
soccer league in Italy. Professional sports data represent a unique
source of data for labor market research, and they are widely used
because they provide detailed statistics about team performance,
as well as the individual athletes’ performances and salaries.
Soccer is a particularly appropriate area of study for our research
question for a number of reasons. First, it is a team sport where
cooperation is crucial, although teams may also win (lose) because
of extraordinarily good (bad) individual performance. Second, it is
possible to identify each individual’s participation (in terms of
minutes played) and to obtain repeated measures of performance
over time (multiple matches in one season). Third, these data are
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reliable, detailed, and reported with high precision. Our dataset
contains information on the net salary of each team member, and
statistics on each team, each team member, each head coach, and
each match. Fourth, this sport is one of the best known and
popular in the world, particularly in Italy, where it generates
revenues of about 1,5 billion euros [38]. Given this popularity,
players’ salaries are highly publicized in the media. This means
that each player is aware of the pay of his teammates, at least until
the opening of a new session of the players’ transfer market (each
January).
Another important reason why we decided to use soccer data is
that each team roster usually consists of around 25 to 30 athletes,
but only 11 to 14 of them actually play a single match, with a
moderate turnover from one match to another. Therefore, these
data allow us to measure the effect of pay dispersion using various
definitions of team and provide an explanation for why the
previous literature has found mixed evidence. The existing
literature cited above [39] looks at end-of-season data, comparing
the wins-to-matches ratio with the pay dispersion of the entire
team roster, paying no attention to individual contributions to
team performance. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the
first to compare the outcome of a single task (a match) with the pay
dispersion of only those who contributed to the task. We believe
our approach improves the precision of the comparison and can
shed new light on our understanding on the effect of pay
dispersion on work performance.
Our data show that the within-team variation of pay dispersion
is related only to the number of injured and disqualified players,
but not to the characteristics of the opponent team or whether the
team plays at home or away. This suggests that pay dispersion is
not chosen strategically by the coach and endogeneity does not
seem to play a role in our dataset. As a further control, in our
analysis we study the relation between team performance and pay
dispersion, including in the specification several characteristics of
the team, the head coach, the match and the opponent team.
Repeating the analysis on a sub-sample of teams homogeneous in
terms of pay size, age, and experience would even reinforce our
results.
Our findings are clear-cut. Using the narrowest definition of a
team, that is, considering only those who played the match and
how long they played for, pay dispersion has an overall negative
impact on team performance; this result is consistent with different
robustness checks. However, that effect changes—and it may even
become significantly positive—when we enlarge the definition of
team to include the entire team roster. We interpret this result as
the consequence of taking an approximation of the correct pay
dispersion where a less precise definition can bias the estimates.
Different scenarios may explain the negative effect of pay
dispersion on team performance.In particular, the effect may come
about because high pay dispersion affect team performance
through lack of cooperation among team members or it comes
about through lack of individual effort. To understand which
explanation is supported by data, we collected all (subjective)
individual performance assessments for each match, for each team,
and for each player reported by the three most popular Italian
sports newspapers. Our results show that higher pay dispersion has
a detrimental impact on individual performances, but has no
significant effect on cooperation. There is, however, a third
possibility that our data unfortunately does not allows us to
satisfactorily address and resolve. Specifically, there is the
possibility that pay dispersion reflects a dispersion of the skills,
abilities and talents of players, and that the association between
pay dispersion and decreased team performance comes about
because a high disparity of skills, etc. makes the team play less well
together. For example, more homogenous players coordinate
efforts better.
Finally, our analysis controls for pay size and we use indicators
of pay dispersion that are dimensionless. For this reason, our
results can be extended to other work contexts, beyond the
peculiar work environment of professional sports. Our findings
may be able to help managers determine which type of pay
distribution will be more effective within a firm and make the right
decisions about which employees to hire. For example, should a
firm hire one expensive superstar employee and two inexpensive
employees, or three medium-priced employees? We provide
numerical examples showing that managers should carefully take
into account the hidden cost of hiring a superstar and its effect on
team performance, while keeping constant the overall team
quality.
Data and Estimation Methodology
Empirical Setting and Data
Our data cover the two seasons 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 of
the men’s major soccer league in Italy (‘‘Serie A’’). Every season 20
teams participate in the league, and each team plays against each
other team twice (one time at the home stadium and one time
away) for a total of 38 matches. After a match three points are
assigned for a win, one point for a draw, and no points for a defeat.
The ultimate goal of each team is to earn points and be classified
as high as possible in the league’s ranking in order to win it or at
least be in the top six positions and in this way gain access to the
European cups. Teams also want to avoid being placed in any of
the bottom three positions, which would relegate them to the
second division. In fact, at the end of each season, the three teams
ranked last are replaced by the three teams ranked first in the
second division.
Our dataset contains information on the outcome of each match
(win, draw, or defeat), on who played every single match and for
how many minutes, and his annual net pay, as well as other
statistics on each player, on each team, on each head coach, and
on each match. We collected this unique dataset by merging data
from the three most popular Italian sports newspapers (La
Gazzetta dello Sport, Corriere dello Sport, and Tutto Sport), and
(for players’ statistics) from the website www.tuttocalciatori.net.
In any season, each team consists of about 25 to 30 athletes
(henceforth, the team roster) specializing in different roles
(goalkeeper, defender, midfielder, forward). However, only 18
members are summoned for each match: 11 (starter players) start
the game and the other 7 (substitutes) sit on the bench and can
enter the match at any time after the beginning, replacing one of
the starter players (who can no longer take further part in the
match). During a match a maximum of three substitutions is
allowed. Common reasons for substitutions include injury,
tiredness, ineffectiveness, or a tactical switch. In the 2009–2010
season 462 players and in the 2010–2011 season 463 players
played for at least one minute during our observation period. In
most cases those who played in one season also played in the other
one; however, from our perspective they are completely different
players because they may earn different salaries in the two seasons.
For this reason and for sake of simplicity and with a little abuse of
terminology, we say that 925 team members have played overall.
A similar argument can be made for teams: because those teams
present in both seasons may have very different lists of team
members, we treat them as different teams, so that our sample
includes 40 teams. We know the salaries of only 874 of the 925
players (94.49%), while we impute the pay of the remaining 51.
This imputation has a negligible impact on our statistics, because
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players for whom we needed to impute salaries have a marginal
role in the team (on average they have played about 1% of the
available time). Repeating our benchmark analysis without
imputations (results available upon request) confirms our findings.
Our dataset includes the matches played between August 23,
2009, and December 20, 2009 (2009–2010 season), and between
August 29, 2010, and December 19, 2010 (2010–2011 season), for
a total of 666 observations. To be conservative and have a clean
dataset, we decided to use only the matches played before the
opening of the January players’ transfer market, during which
every team is allowed to trade players with other teams. We then
ignored the remaining matches, for which we cannot be sure about
the exact salaries of players transferred, especially the ones coming
from foreign leagues. On average these players account for around
12% of the team members after the January market, and they
usually take a relevant role in the team—playing most of the
remaining matches. If we included these data, any guesses about
the missing salaries would likely bias our estimates. However, there
is relatively high correlation (0.589) between the number of points
earned in the first 17 matches and the number of points earned in
the remaining matches.
Variables and Estimation Method
Our unit of analysis is the team playing a match in a given
season; in total we then have 40 teams, 20 for each season. Recall
that the team may win, draw, or lose a match, earning respectively
three, one, or no points. Our dependent variable, measuring team
performance, is a dummy equal to 1 if the team wins the match
(which happens in 37.24% of the cases); it is equal to 0 if the team
draws or loses the match. We group draws and defeats together
because the ultimate goal for a team is to win a match. In a
robustness check, we repeat the analysis treating first both wins
and draws as a positive outcome, and then each outcome
separately. Our main results were confirmed (Supplementary
material available upon request).
We perform a probit regression with panel-robust standard
errors (clustered for each team in each season); this way we allow
for possible correlation across observations referring to different
matches of the same team. We opted for this model because our
data show no evidence of team-specific panel effects (see the
discussion at the end of Section 3.1); use of this model allows us to
obtain more efficient estimates.
Our purpose is to obtain measures of pay dispersion, as well as
other indicators, that are specific for each match of each team. For
this purpose, the term active team members (ATMs) for a team in a
given match refers to all team members who actually played at
least one minute of the match. For such a match we then neglect
all of the remaining members who did not contribute to the result
of the match. As a consequence, the set of active team members
for a team varies match by match.
The benchmark specification includes different variables that
for clarity we group into six categories: pay, team, coach, match,
opponent, and time. Our focus is on the first group of pay variables;
the remaining ones serve as control variables. In the analysis, all of
the variables concerning team composition are based solely on the
ATMs, and the contribution of each member is weighted by the
amount of time he actually played in the match. The variables in
the pay and team categories thus refer to the ATMs of the team,
whereas the variables in the opponent category refer to the ATMs
of the opponent team. This means that pay, team, and opponent
statistics differ match by match and that members who had no
active role in the match are ignored. In what follows we discuss the
variables used in the analysis.
Pay variables. We consider the logarithm of the average pay,
and the logarithm of a dimensionless measure of pay dispersion. In
all the cases we refer to annual salaries in thousands of euros net of
taxes. Let us define pi,x as the pay of player i,i~1, . . . ,I in team
x,x~1, . . . ,X , where mi,x,t[ 0,90½  represents the minutes of the
match actually played by the same player in match t,t~1, . . . ,T .








As a pay dispersion measure, we take the Theil index. This
indicator belongs to the class of entropy indexes and is frequently
used to measure economic inequality. The index is defined as the
mean of the products between individual pay relative to average














The index is equal to 0 for the case of no pay dispersion (i.e., all
salaries are identical); a higher index denotes higher pay
dispersion. Notice that the indicator is dimensionless, which
means that what matters to us is only the individual pay relative to
the average pay; this allows us to compare pay distributions across
teams and matches, disregarding the average pay level, which
varies markedly (from 213,808 euros to 4,356,061 euros). As a
robustness check, we repeated the analysis using the popular Gini
index rather than the Theil index. In this case our main findings
were qualitatively confirmed, and quantitatively even emphasized
(Supplementary material available upon request).
Team variables. We use weighted average values in a given
match for players’ ages, the fraction of new players on the team,
and the number of years (even if not consecutive) on the team and
in the Italian first division; the last two variables serve to proxy
players’ experience.
Coach variables. For the coach we use the same set of
information as for the team, that is: coach age, a dummy variable
equal to 1 if he is in his first season with the team, and the number
of years (even if not consecutive) on the team and in the Italian first
division. Head coaches in soccer are often fired from one season to
another, and even during the same season. We then also include in
the analysis a dummy variable equal to one if the head coach has
been replaced during the season.
Match variables. We use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
team plays a domestic (home) match. In addition, soccer players
may be sanctioned with a yellow or red card for a specific
misconduct; multiple yellow cards or one red card produce an
automatic disqualification for at least one following match. We
therefore use the number of disqualified players as well as the
number of injured players. These variables are added because
injuries and disqualifications may prevent a coach from using his
preferred players during a match. However, we expect disqual-
ifications to have a stronger effect because they usually involve
team members who play more frequently.
Opponent variables. We consider the same variables as in
the pay and team groups, but we base them on the ATMs of the
opponent team. The purpose is to in this way capture the
characteristics (in particular the strength) of the opposing team. An
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alternative would be to add as many dummy variables as the teams
(40). Doing so, our main results would be confirmed. The
shortcoming of such an approach, however, is the potential
inefficiency of estimating many coefficients in a probit regression
model; for this reason we prefer our benchmark specification.
Time variables. We use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
match was played during the 2010–2011 season, and dummy
variables for the month if the match was played from August to
December.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 lists all variables used in the analysis and reports some
summary statistics. All statistics are calculated for the ATMs in the
666 observations of our sample. The purpose of using all of these
variables is to control for the physical, social, and other
characteristics of the team members, the coach, and the match.
From the table we learn that, for the median observation, the
ATMs’ average pay is 584 thousand euros, the Theil index is 0.093
(ranging from 0.006 to 0.497), on average the ATMs are around
27 years old, they already have accumulated two years of
experience in the team and five years in the first division, and
around 26% of them are in their first year with the team. In
addition, 57% of the coaches are new to the team, 14% of them
started managing the team after the beginning of the season, and
they have little experience with the team and the first division.
Finally, disqualifications and especially injuries are frequent, and
sometimes they may force the coach to reshape the starting team
formation (in fact, we observe a maximum of 4 disqualified players
and 11 injured players). In our analysis we account for this when
measuring the effect of pay dispersion; further statistics on pay
dispersion are shown in the supplementary material (available
upon request).
Table 2 lists the teams in our dataset (20 for each season) and
some average statistics (age, experience, fraction of new players)
for their ATMs in each match. Teams are listed according to the
ranking at the end of each season, where the first team listed is the
winner of the championship and the last three teams are
eventually relegated to the second division.
First of all, we notice that the 17 teams enrolled in both seasons
show marked differences over the two years. From the table we
also observe wide heterogeneity across teams within the same
season, with no clear pattern going from bottom to top teams. The
last column of Table 2 shows the fraction of players that in our
sample played at least for one minute. This fraction is between
0.69 and 0.96; note that it is always below 1. This indicates that
some team members never play; usually those excluded are injured
and homegrown players. Ignoring this, and treating all team
members equally, the analysis on the effect of pay dispersion may
generate different results, as we later clarify.
To stress this point, Figure 1 plots for each team the fraction of
wins over the Theil index, using two different methods. In the top
panel, the pay dispersion index is based on the whole team roster,
disregarding players’ involvement in the matches; this is the
standard approach adopted in the literature. In the bottom panel,
the index is the average over the matches, where for each match
pay dispersion is based on the ATM; this approach is closer to the
one followed in this paper. First of all, we notice that the index
calculated in the top panel uses values that are on a higher scale
than those of the index in the bottom panel; the reason is that this
measure is inflated by the low pay of those members (usually the
homegrown ones) who, although formal members of the team, do
not contribute to the team’s performance.
The figure also shows a line indicating the predicted winning
probability for a given level of the Theil index. The prediction is
obtained from a simple probit regression over 666 observations,
where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the team wins the
Table 1. Summary statistics (666 observations on 40 teams).
Variable Median Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Pay
Average pay (thousands of euros) 583.788 1039.801 998.699 213.808 4356.061
Theil index 0.093 0.114 0.077 0.006 0.497
Team
Fraction of new players in the team 0.255 0.263 0.156 0 0.701
Years in the team 2.202 2.341 1.039 0.483 5.985
Years in first division 4.635 4.858 1.510 1.597 9.645
Average age 27.465 27.488 1.327 24.298 30.889
Coach
New to the team 1 0.571 0.495 0 1
Replaced during season 0 0.144 0.351 0 1
Years in the team 0 0.685 0.982 0 4
Years in first division 3 4.372 3.686 0 14
Age 48 49.414 6.882 38 65
Match
Injured players 3 3.081 1.798 0 11
Disqualified players 0 0.431 0.662 0 4
Home play 0.5 0.5 0.500 0 1
Note: For the ‘‘opponent’’ variables we consider the same variables as in the pay and team categories, but we base them on the ATM of the opposing team. We do not report
summary statistics because they coincide with those in the pay and team categories.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112631.t001
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Table 2. Team statistics.
a) 2009–2010 Season
Team Fraction new to the team Years on the team Years in first division Age Fraction of players employed
FC Internazionale Milano 0.314 3.553 4.961 29.320 0.733
AS Roma 0.093 3.755 6.278 28.378 0.871
AC Milan 0.128 4.538 8.063 29.619 0.786
UC Sampdoria 0.265 1.862 5.751 26.639 0.778
US Citta` di Palermo 0.188 1.650 4.085 25.886 0.852
SSC Napoli 0.289 1.465 4.743 26.897 0.808
Juventus FC 0.239 3.056 5.838 28.460 0.929
Parma FC 0.535 0.847 6.160 27.604 0.808
Genoa CFC 0.359 1.527 4.421 27.760 0.786
AS Bari 0.435 1.507 2.836 26.267 0.774
ACF Fiorentina 0.110 2.695 7.519 27.818 0.750
SS Lazio 0.042 2.582 5.689 27.455 0.806
Catania Calcio 0.282 1.650 2.333 26.120 0.893
Cagliari Calcio 0.134 3.406 4.695 26.910 0.720
Udinese Calcio 0.131 2.370 4.312 25.502 0.733
AC Chievo Verona 0.199 2.647 4.622 29.198 0.852
Bologna FC 0.439 0.810 5.098 29.076 0.815
Atalanta Calcio 0.253 2.513 4.024 26.915 0.923
AS Siena 0.302 1.692 4.203 26.550 0.885
AS Livorno 0.310 1.552 3.689 27.437 0.800
AVERAGE 0.252 2.280 4.962 27.491 0.834
b) 2010–2011 Season
Team Fraction new to the team Years on the team Years in first division Age Fraction of players employed
AC Milan 0.228 4.749 7.927 29.480 0.828
FC Internazionale Milano 0.108 3.786 5.430 29.308 0.862
SSC Napoli 0.166 1.766 5.393 27.573 0.917
Udinese Calcio 0.166 3.117 4.723 25.740 0.909
SS Lazio 0.196 2.130 4.479 27.918 0.846
AS Roma 0.188 4.001 7.135 29.506 0.963
Juventus FC 0.542 2.066 5.297 27.173 0.926
US Citta` di Palermo 0.308 1.555 3.299 24.939 0.692
ACF Fiorentina 0.124 2.960 7.440 27.659 0.929
Genoa CFC 0.499 1.550 4.310 27.718 0.846
AC Chievo Verona 0.434 2.065 3.594 27.916 0.880
Parma FC 0.311 1.358 5.315 27.914 0.769
Cagliari Calcio 0.077 3.281 4.391 26.090 0.760
Catania Calcio 0.083 2.255 2.887 27.144 0.889
Bologna FC 0.399 0.902 3.363 26.605 0.923
AC Cesena 0.494 1.703 4.168 28.302 0.852
US Lecce 0.401 2.446 2.529 27.306 0.926
UC Sampdoria 0.124 2.258 5.975 26.046 0.929
Brescia Calcio 0.383 2.446 4.015 28.541 0.960
AS Bari 0.236 2.322 3.679 27.012 0.929
AVERAGE 0.274 2.401 4.755 27.484 0.873
Note: Teams are listed according to their position at the end of the season; teams promoted from second division are highlighted. Averages for each team are based on the
ATM of all of the matches (either 16 or 17) played by the team in a given season. Fraction of players employed: number of players employed at least for one minute over total
number of players.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112631.t002
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match, and 0 otherwise; the specification includes just the constant
and the Theil index, based on either the whole team roster (top
panel) or the ATM of each match (bottom panel). Comparing the
two panels, we see that pay dispersion positively affects team
performance when considering the whole team roster (top panel),
whereas it has no impact when considering the ATMs (bottom
panel). This suggests that results may change depending on how
pay dispersion is measured. This finding warns us that findings
may change depending on our definition of what constitutes a
‘‘team.’’
We conclude this section with an exploratory analysis of the
effect of pay dispersion on performance, which is our ultimate
goal. Overall in the data, pay dispersion shows no significant
difference (t test: 0.37; p value: 0.712) when the match is won
(average: 0.116) or when the match is drawn/lost (average: 0.114).
Pay dispersion is not even affected by the team performance of the
previous match (t test: 0.607; p value: 0.544; average after a match
won: 0.117; average after a match drawn/lost: 0.113). This
suggests that the coach does not adjust it to keep the team compact
in case of performance problems.
Table 3 then shows, separately for each team, the average pay,
the average Theil index, and the wins ratio. Teams are listed as in
Table 2, following their ranking at the end of the season. The first
thing to note brings to mind the famous slogan ‘‘The more you
spend, the more you get.’’ Indeed, teams that spend more (i.e., with
a higher average pay) rank higher at the end of the season. In fact,
our data exhibit a large Spearman’s rank correlation (0.701)
between average team pay and the wins ratio in the season. The
data thus suggest that better players are also better paid, and for
this reason we can interpret the average pay of a team as a proxy
for the average skill in the team. In contrast, pay dispersion is
much less highly correlated with the wins ratio (the rank
correlation is 0.241), although the sign of this correlation is still
positive.
A problem with this analysis is that it ignores the specific
characteristics of each team. For this reason, we now compare,
separately for each team, the wins ratio obtained in two groups of
matches, where the Theil index is either below or above the
median for the team. The last column of Table 3 shows that the
wins ratio is higher in the matches with high pay dispersion in only
11 cases out of 40.
We have then found that, looking at the same data, one can
interpret the relationship between team performance and pay
dispersion as positive (considering all the team members: Figure 1,
top panel), null (considering the ATMs: Figure 1, bottom panel),
or negative (considering the ATMs separately for each team:
Table 3). Our empirical exercise in the next section further
analyzes the relationship considering the ATMs, each match
separately, and controlling for the most relevant characteristics of
the team, the coach, the match, and the opponent.
Pay Dispersion and Team Performance
In this section we summarize our main findings regarding the
effect of pay dispersion on team performance. We then discuss
some robustness checks around the definition of team members,
and we report the results of a further analysis connecting pay
dispersion with individual performance. Our benchmark estimates
are shown in Table 4.
Benchmark Analysis
The first column of Table 4 reports the average marginal effects
from our benchmark probit regression analysis. The column shows
that pay dispersion has a negative impact on team performance:
doubling pay dispersion, the probability of winning a match would
reduce on average by 0.06. Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots the
predicted winning probability, conditional on pay dispersion and
the other explanatory variables (fixed to their average), computed
using this probit regression. It shows that probability falls, from
0.56 when there is no pay dispersion, to 0.24 when the Theil index
is T=0.50.
Figure 1. Team performance and pay dispersion (40 team observations).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112631.g001
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Table 3. Pay and team performance.
a) 2009–2010 Season
Team Average pay Theil index Wins ratio: average by matches (2)–(1).0
All Low disp. High disp.
(1) (2)
FC Internazionale Milano 4115.021 0.101 0.706 0.875 0.556 NO
AS Roma 1718.652 0.232 0.471 0.375 0.556 YES
AC Milan 3250.733 0.147 0.563 0.750 0.375 NO
UC Sampdoria 724.647 0.393 0.412 0.750 0.111 NO
US Citta` di Palermo 658.497 0.083 0.412 0.500 0.333 NO
SSC Napoli 842.041 0.103 0.412 0.500 0.333 NO
Juventus FC 2673.181 0.123 0.529 0.625 0.444 NO
Parma FC 536.108 0.062 0.471 0.500 0.444 NO
Genoa CFC 817.235 0.058 0.438 0.500 0.375 NO
AS Bari 435.087 0.126 0.375 0.125 0.625 YES
ACF Fiorentina 1177.068 0.072 0.438 0.250 0.625 YES
SS Lazio 729.187 0.229 0.176 0.125 0.222 YES
Catania Calcio 413.871 0.048 0.118 0.125 0.111 NO
Cagliari Calcio 367.552 0.084 0.438 0.625 0.250 NO
Udinese Calcio 464.575 0.103 0.313 0.250 0.375 YES
AC Chievo Verona 380.442 0.042 0.412 0.500 0.333 NO
Bologna FC 523.939 0.106 0.250 0.375 0.125 NO
Atalanta Calcio 334.134 0.060 0.188 0.125 0.250 YES
AS Siena 436.847 0.083 0.176 0.250 0.111 NO
AS Livorno 358.900 0.125 0.294 0.500 0.111 NO
b) 2010–2011 Season
Team Average pay Theil index Wins ratio: average by matches (2)–(1).0
All Low disp. High disp.
(1) (2)
AC Milan 3590.499 0.191 0.647 0.750 0.556 NO
FC Internazionale Milano 3250.635 0.167 0.400 0.429 0.375 NO
SSC Napoli 918.736 0.102 0.588 0.625 0.556 NO
Udinese Calcio 568.033 0.065 0.412 0.500 0.333 NO
SS Lazio 1099.115 0.075 0.588 0.750 0.444 NO
AS Roma 2049.492 0.177 0.471 0.625 0.333 NO
Juventus FC 2034.127 0.119 0.471 0.500 0.444 NO
US Citta` di Palermo 576.675 0.111 0.471 0.500 0.444 NO
ACF Fiorentina 1024.088 0.108 0.313 0.250 0.375 YES
Genoa CFC 1128.980 0.236 0.375 0.500 0.250 NO
AC Chievo Verona 316.556 0.035 0.294 0.375 0.222 NO
Parma FC 559.824 0.068 0.235 0.250 0.222 NO
Cagliari Calcio 403.838 0.078 0.294 0.250 0.333 YES
Catania Calcio 447.094 0.069 0.294 0.250 0.333 YES
Bologna FC 555.712 0.119 0.294 0.125 0.444 YES
AC Cesena 223.423 0.044 0.250 0.250 0.250 =
US Lecce 300.007 0.023 0.235 0.375 0.111 NO
UC Sampdoria 897.708 0.121 0.313 0.250 0.375 YES
Brescia Calcio 359.365 0.195 0.235 0.250 0.222 NO
AS Bari 482.681 0.093 0.118 0.250 0.000 NO
Note: See note to Table 2. Average pay is in thousand euros. For each team we split matches in two groups based on whether the Theil index was below (low) or not below
(high) the median value for the team.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112631.t003
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An example will help the reader understand this figure. Suppose
a team manager has to buy 11 new players who are expected to
play all the next matches fully and on a regular basis. Your budget
is limited, and you have to decide whether to buy (at the same total
expenditure) either 1 top player and 10 average players, or instead
11 players with above-average skill. We assume their pays reflect
their skill. Further, let us say that the average pay is 600 thousand
euros (the actual pay size in our sample; however, this is irrelevant
for the pay dispersion index) and that the manager can choose to
pay all 11 players the same amount (600 thousand euros) or 1 top
player much more (1.5 million euros as opposed to 510 thousand
euros for the other ones). In the latter case the top player will earn
2.5 times the average pay, while each other player will earn 0.85
times the average pay; this pay distribution roughly corresponds to
the median distribution in the sample. The resulting Theil index is
T=0.083, whereas it is T=0 if all 11 players earn 600 thousand
euros each. Hence, higher pay dispersion denotes higher
variability of players’ skills. Our estimates suggest that, everything
else being equal, the differentiated pay distribution will make the
probability of winning a match fall on average by 20%, from 0.56
to 0.36.
In our regression we also find significant evidence of a positive
effect of average pay (doubling it would increase the probability of
winning a match by around 0.15), replacing a coach during the
season (the probability then increases by 0.12), and playing at
home (0.25). In addition, we find significantly negative effects for
the coach’s experience with the team (one more year reduces the
probability of winning a match by 0.03) and the opponent’s
average pay (doubling it would reduce the probability by 0.17).
These results are not surprising: on average, the pay can be seen as
a proxy for a player’s skill (above we made an argument about
this); replacement of a coach during the season may have a large
psychological impact on the players; a team playing in its home
stadium may benefit from the support of its fans; the longer a
coach is on the team, the lower is the strength of his effort and the
psychological impact on the players; and the opponent’s average
pay can also be seen as a proxy for its skill, which then lowers the
winning probability of the team. No other explanatory variables—
noticeably, those on the team characteristics and on the
opponent’s pay dispersion—are significantly different from 0, at
least at a 5% significance level.
The ‘‘rho’’ coefficient, shown in the bottom part of Table 4, is
the proportion of the total variance contributed by the team-level
variance. This is statistically equal to 0, indicating that we can
disregard the panel dimension of our data, and run our analysis
with a probit regression on the pooled dataset. In what follows we
then perform pooled probit regressions with team-clustered
standard errors, because this approach is more efficient than
using panel regression methods (fewer parameters have to be
estimated).
In an additional analysis (Supplementary material, Section B.1;
available upon request), we discuss the link between pay dispersion
and the main characteristics of the match and the team opponent,
showing positive correlation with the number of injured and
disqualified players, but no correlation with the characteristics of
the opponent team or whether the team plays at home or away.
This suggests that match-by-match variations in pay dispersion are
not driven by strategic reasons. The section then replicates our
analysis on a sub-sample of teams homogeneous in terms of pay
size, age and experience. In this case, the effect of pay dispersion
on team performance would remain negative, but larger than in
the benchmark analysis (20.16 rather than 20.06). Section B.2
repeats the benchmark analysis, also treating draws as a positive
outcome, and confirms our benchmark results. Moreover, Section
B.3 reports the results of some robustness checks on the
specification, where we substitute the Theil index with the Gini
index (which actually shows a stronger significant effect: 20.13
rather than 20.06), or where we add an indicator of the symmetry
of the pay distribution (eventually not significant), a quadratic
polynomial on pay dispersion, or the interaction between the index
and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the team played a match in
December. In the latter two cases, the purpose is to understand
whether the effect of pay dispersion is non-monotonic or if it
changes as team members get to know each other better. In
neither case are the added variables significantly different from 0.
In addition Section 3.3 discusses, among other things, the
relationship between team performance and different technologies
of production.
Team Members
We repeat the analysis with the same regression specification as
in the benchmark case, but this time we consider different
definitions of team members. As we have already seen, the
definition affects the computation of the variables on pay, team,
and opponent statistics that are all match specific. The effect of
pay dispersion on team performance may then change with the
definition of group. The average marginal effects from the analysis
are shown in columns (2), (3), and (4) of Table 4; the latest column
is based on the broadest definition of team members.
Unweighted ATM. We first consider the ATM, as in the
benchmark, but disregarding the amount of time they actually
played. For instance, if the match started with 11 players and then
3 substitutes also took part in the match, we derive our pay and
players statistics from the characteristics of 14 team members,
without weights.
Our results are reported in column (2) of Table 4, and they are
close to the benchmark case of column (1). In particular, pay
dispersion is still associated with a negative marginal effect of 2
0.06, although the effect is now significant at only 10%. This
suggests that ignoring the amount of time spent in the field may
create noise in the estimates.
Potential players. We then consider as team members all 18
athletes who were potentially able to play in the match because
they were either starter players or substitute players. In this
manner we exclude injured players, disqualified players, or players
who are out of the match as a result of a decision made by the
coach. All members are given the same weight, disregarding the
number of minutes they actually played in the match. This
definition of team members is less precise than our benchmark
definition of ATMs, because at least four of these members in each
match make no contribution to team performance, but they still
affect the pay, team, and opponent statistics.
Our results are shown in column (3) of Table 4. Most variables
show effects that are in line with the benchmark results; however,
the pay dispersion index is now associated with a coefficient
insignificantly different from zero.
Entire team roster. We conclude the analysis by considering
as team members all athletes enrolled on the team, that is, the
entire team roster, thus including injured, disqualified, and
homegrown players. Hence, we consider the same team compo-
sition in each match, disregarding who actually played. This
implies that, in our regression equation, the variables on pay and
team statistics are constant for a given team (they are then fixed
‘‘team effects’’), and the variables on opponent statistics are
constant for a given opponent team. Such an approach is similar
to that of some previous works in the literature, because it does not
pay attention to whether and how much each team member
contributed to team performance.
Pay Dispersion and Performance in Teams
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 November 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 11 | e112631
Table 4. Team performance and pay dispersion (average marginal effects).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Members: ATM Unweighted Potential Roster
Pay: Log(average pay) 0.146*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.076**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.039)
Log(pay dispersion index) 20.061** 20.058* 20.046 0.167**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.082)
Team: Fraction of new players on the team 0.095 0.040 0.059 0.044
(0.143) (0.148) (0.144) (0.141)
Years on the team 0.015 0.011 0.020 0.006
(0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.037)
Years in first division 0.002 20.004 20.006 0.006
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
Age 0.001 0.014 0.005* 0.009
(0.017) (0.016) (0.002) (0.017)
Coach: New to the team 20.091* 20.086* 20.089* 20.116**
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.046)
Replaced during the season 0.119** 0.115** 0.120** 0.108**
(0.051) (0.054) (0.056) (0.048)
Years on the team 20.034** 20.033** 20.032** 20.033**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Years in first division 0.010* 0.011** 0.011** 0.009*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.000 20.000 0.000 20.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Match: Injured players 20.006 20.005 20.004 20.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Disqualified players 0.040* 0.040* 0.040* 0.024
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Home play 0.253*** 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.256***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
Opponent: Log(average pay) 20.169*** 20.160*** 20.183*** 20.125***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.037)
Log(pay dispersion index) 0.030 0.018 0.015 20.083
(0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.095)
Fraction of new players on the team 0.139 0.206* 0.088 0.183
(0.105) (0.119) (0.120) (0.153)
Years on the team 0.044* 0.048* 0.045 0.084**
(0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.041)
Years in first division 0.001 0.004 0.012 20.014
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025)
Age 0.004 20.007 20.003** 20.019
(0.015) (0.017) (0.001) (0.020)
+ time dummy variables on month and year of the match
Log-likelihood 2371.461 2371.522 2370.738 2371.522
McFadden R2 0.155 0.155 0.157 0.155
Count R2 0.689 0.688 0.700 0.688
Rho coefficient 0.000
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Our results are shown in column (4) of Table 4, and they are
largely different from our benchmark analysis of column (1): we
find a smaller effect of the team average pay (0.08 instead of 0.15),
while the effect of pay dispersion is now even positive: according to
these estimates, doubling pay dispersion would increase the
probability of winning by 0.17. In contrast, the remaining
variables, which have not changed relative to the benchmark case
(they do not depend on the definition of team members), provide
parameter estimates comparable with those of the benchmark
case.
The results in Table 4 thus inform that, when broadening the
definition of team (i.e., when going from column 1 to column 4),
conclusions about the effects of pay dispersion change enormously:
at a 5% level we may indeed find either a negative effect (column
1), a null effect (columns 2 and 3), or a positive one (column 4).
Figure 2 plots the predicted winning probability, conditional on
pay dispersion and the other explanatory variables (fixed to their
average), computed separately from each of the four probit
regressions in Table 4. From the figure it is clear that the direction
of the effect goes from negative to positive as we use less
information on the group definition, from panel (b) (where we
ignore the amount of time actually played) to panel (c) (where we
consider all starter and substitute players), and on to panel (d)
(where we include the whole team roster).
This result is essentially a warning that the measurement of an
effect can be biased if we do not consider a precise definition of
Table 4. Cont.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Members: ATM Unweighted Potential Roster
LR test rho = 0 0.000
[0.496]
Note: 666 observations on 40 teams (on average, 16.6 matches per team). The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 in case of win. Pay and team statistics are based on ATM
players (column 1); ATM players, not weighted by the amount of time they actually played (column 2); all potential players (starter players and substitute players; column 3);





Figure 2. Predicted winning probability by pay dispersion. Note: Predictions are based on the average explanatory variables and the
parameter estimates from Table 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112631.g002
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what constitutes a ‘‘team.’’ Notice in particular that we find a
positive effect when we look at the most general definition (whole
team roster). Those who play little or not at all usually earn less
than those who play regularly. See supplementary material
(available upon request), Section A.4, for details.
As a result, pay dispersion increases if we use a definition of
team that incorporates them; in particular, considering the entire
team roster, the index is on average 0.493, as opposed to 0.114 if
we consider just the ATMs. Pay dispersion increases significantly
more in the top 10 teams at the end of December of each season:
the average difference between the pay dispersion index computed
from the team roster and from the ATMs is on average 0.437
among the top teams, as opposed to 0.321 among the other teams
(t test: 16.512; p value: 0.000). The pay dispersion index then
captures part of the effect of the team skill; indeed, the correlation
between average pay and pay dispersion is 0.722 using the whole
team roster, whereas it is only 0.253 using the ATM. This
correlation may explain why in column (4) of Table 4 the effect of
pay dispersion is positive, and the effect of average pay is about
half the effect found in the other three columns.
This suggests that our benchmark conclusions are not driven by
a dataset with different features than others. Actually, our
conclusions depend on the way we look at the data, and in
particular on what we mean by ‘‘team members.’’ This may
explain why in the literature we observe different results, and it
shows the importance of the precision of the definition of team to
evaluate the effect of pay dispersion.
Individual Performance
So far the analysis has focused on objective indicators of team
performance. Team performance, however, derives from individ-
ual performance and cooperation among team members. It is then
possible that we observe poor team performance because there is
poor individual performance or because there is little cooperation.
For instance, in soccer, we can observe a poor team performance
when each player tries to score without passing the ball to other
players (lack of cooperation) or when each player prefers not to
take the initiative but instead passes the ball to other players,
thereby delegating to them the responsibility to score (the lack of
effort). One may thus wonder what determines the detrimental
effect of pay dispersion on team performance. Does pay dispersion
work as a disincentive to individual effort? Alternatively, does pay
dispersion merely decrease cooperation between players, leaving
individual performance unchanged? These are the issues we want
to address in this section.
Our data suggest that teams that win more often make
significantly more passes during the match: the 20 teams winning
more frequently on average make 410.47 passes, significantly more
than the other teams making on average 383.52 passes (t test:
1.876; p value: 0.034). In Section B.2 of the supplementary
material (available upon request), we report the output of a within-
group panel regression analysis of the number of passes over the
same specification as in the benchmark. We find no significant
effect of pay dispersion. To the extent that the number of passes
can be seen as a valid measure of team cooperation, the finding
may be interpreted as an indication that team cooperation is not
affected by pay dispersion. If our argument is correct, team
performance is then affected solely by individual performance.
Obtaining an objective and thorough measurement of individ-
ual performance is impossible in our environment, because soccer
is a team sport where few individual statistics are recorded
compared to other sports such as baseball. (See, e.g., Scully (1974)
for an analysis of the connection between individual performance
and individual pay [40].) In addition, those few existing individual
statistics record rare events (e.g., goals, assists, yellow cards) and
are highly role specific (e.g., a forward player is more likely to score
a goal than any other player). It would be difficult to use these
statistics as measures of individual performance.
In Italy, however, it is quite common for journalists, when
writing a newspaper report about a match, to assign a ‘‘mark’’ to
each single player’s performance. The mark is a number based on
a scale from 0 to 10; a mark of 6 denotes fair performance and
higher marks indicate good or excellent performance. This mark
represents a subjective individual performance assessment (SIPA),
because it is based only on the arbitrary opinion and taste of the
journalist who attended the match. Still, it is a rough indicator of
the individual performance of each team member and can be used
to look at the effect of pay dispersion on individual team members.
In this regard we collected all of the SIPAs for the players involved
in the 333 matches considered in the main analysis, using the three
major sport newspapers in Italy: La Gazzetta dello Sport, Corriere
dello Sport, and Tutto Sport. To make SIPAs less heavily affected
by the personal opinion of the journalists, we took an average
SIPA from the three newspapers (the SIPAs from the three sources
show a correlation of around 0.7). Overall we have 8,226
observations on 876 players (434 in the 2009–2010 season and
442 in the 2010–2011 season), who then played an average of 9.39
matches each. The number of players considered is smaller than
the number of players who played at least for one minute, 925,
because marks are given only to those who play a significant
portion of the match. The decision on what is a ‘‘significant
portion of the match’’ is subjective, and different journalists may
have different opinions. In a separate analysis in the supplemen-
tary material (available upon request), Section B.4, we take the
SIPAs from the major sport newspaper, La Gazzetta dello Sport,
and add to the specification dummy variables on the journalist
who made the SIPA. Our main conclusions are confirmed, both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
Figure 3 plots the distribution of SIPAs in our sample. We see
that SIPAs are concentrated between 4 and 9, with a peak around
6 (fair performance). Table 5 reports some summary statistics at
the player level. First of all, we notice that SIPAs are generally
higher when the team wins a match. However, low SIPAs are
possible also in this case: players may indeed receive a SIPA of 4
even if their team wins the match. Moreover, the table lists some
statistics about the main player’s characteristics: his pay, his age,
his past experience with the team and the first division, and his
role (midfielder, forward, as opposed to goalkeeper or defender).
We observe wide heterogeneity on these variables.
SIPAs show a weakly positive correlation with individual salaries
(0.09) and team average pay (0.05), and a weakly negative
correlation with pay dispersion (20.05). It is also interesting to
understand which ‘‘technology of production’’—meant as a
combination of individual SIPAs—determines team performance.
If we regressed team performance over the minimum, mean, and
maximum SIPAs of the team in the match (controlling for team,
coach, match, opponent, and time characteristics), we would find
all coefficients to be significant at 1%, suggesting that different
technologies coexist. However, the average marginal effect of the
mean SIPA is quantitatively much higher: 0.717, as opposed to 2
0.069 for the minimum SIPA and 0.129 for the maximum SIPA.
This suggests that team performance depends on the individual
effort of all players, more than on the effort of the best/worst ones.
The analysis in this section is meant to assist in understanding
the link between individual performance and pay dispersion using
an approach similar to our benchmark analysis. For this purpose
we run a regression analysis, where the dependent variable is the
individual SIPA, and the specification includes variables on the
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player (pay relative to the average pay, age, experience, and role),
as well as the same variables used in Table 4. We consider ATMs
as team members to construct our statistics. Table 6 shows the
output from this regression, where we estimate the coefficients
using a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) method with player-
clustered standard errors (column 1), a random-effect (RE) panel
GLS method (column 2), or a fixed-effect (FE) panel OLS method
(column 3); the latter method does not allow us to separate the
effect of match-invariant variables from the player-specific effect.
The ‘‘rho’’ coefficient reported in the bottom part of the table
suggests that, in this context, it is important to consider player-
specific effects. Moreover, the statistical tests comparing the three
models, reported at the end of the table, suggest that it is advisable
to use a panel method.
Our main findings are as follows. In columns (1) and (2), where
we can estimate the effects of match-invariant variables, we find
positive effects for individual pay, years of experience with the
team, and the midfield role of the player (a core role in soccer).
The direction of all of these effects is intuitive. Notice in particular
that a high relative pay seems to work as an incentive on individual
performance; this result is in line with, for instance, the results of
Pfeffer and Langton (1993) [41]. However, giving a dispropor-
tionately high pay to some is not necessarily an effective strategy.
In fact, it may give rise to high pay dispersion, and in Table 6 we
consistently find a negative effect for the team pay dispersion. In
addition, we find positive effects for playing at home, number of
disqualified players, and the opponent’s pay dispersion, and a
negative effect for the opponent’s average pay.
In Section B.5 of the supplementary material (available upon
request), we repeat the same analysis, adding into the specification
variables that consider whether the player is a ‘‘superstar’’ (when
he earns at least two times the average pay in the team) or a
‘‘regular player’’ (one of the 11 most frequent players in the first
month of the season), alone and interacting with pay dispersion.
Interestingly, we find that SIPA increases with regular players, and
responds more negatively to pay dispersion among superstars. In
particular the first result suggests that infrequent players, when
they have ‘‘all eyes on them’’ during the match, are not able to
perform as well as the regular players for whom they substitute.
Figure 4 reports the predicted SIPA conditional on pay
dispersion and the average explanatory variables, using the
estimates from column (2) of Table 6. We focus on this column,
rather than column (3), because it shows a lower effect of pay
dispersion (20.08 instead of 20.14), and overall it provides more
convincing estimates—in particular, because it shows significant
effects as a result of the players’ and team salaries. As its
counterpart for team performance (panel [a] of Figure 2), the
figure shows that the SIPA is the highest when there is no pay
dispersion at all. This suggests that pay dispersion has a
detrimental effect not just on team performance, but that it also
negatively impacts individual performance.
To interpret this figure, we return to our previous example with
the team manager. Suppose the manager has to choose whether to
increase or decrease the current pay dispersion (where 1 player
earns 2.5 times the average income, and each of the 10 remaining
players earns 0.85 times the average income). The outcome of this
choice is not trivial, because varying the distribution of pays affects
not only pay dispersion, but also the average pay and the players’
pay, which in turn have different implications on individual
performance. To keep the situation simple, let us say that the
Figure 3. Distribution of individual SIPAs (8,226 observations).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112631.g003
Table 5. Summary statistics, individual players (8,226 observations on 876 players).
Variable Median Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
SIPA
If win 6.333 6.308 0.563 4 8.833
If draw 6 5.968 0.504 4 7.833
If defeat 5.667 5.631 0.531 4 7.833
OVERALL 6 5.966 0.611 4 8.833
Individual variables
Pay (thousands of euros) 600 1029.200 1255.642 30 10500
Pay/average pay 0.920 0.997 0.496 0.010 4.348
New to the team 0 0.271 0.445 0 1
Years on the team 1 2.287 2.679 0 18
Years in first division 4 4.789 3.807 0 18
Age 27 27.429 3.954 17 41
Midfield role 0 0.399 0.490 0 1
Forward role 0 0.191 0.393 0 1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112631.t005
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Table 6. Individual performance and pay dispersion (average marginal effects).
(1) (2) (3)
Method: Pooled OLS RE GLS FE OLS
Player: Pay/average pay 0.105*** 0.110*** 20.220
(0.021) (0.020) (0.172)
New to the team 20.002 20.004
(0.026) (0.023)
Years on the team 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.005)




Midfield role 0.047** 0.050***
(0.019) (0.019)
Forward role 20.015 20.014
(0.028) (0.026)
Pay: Log(average pay) 0.082*** 0.080*** 20.253
(0.019) (0.017) (0.196)
Log(pay dispersion index) 20.064*** 20.080*** 20.139***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.024)
Team: Fraction of new players on the team 0.053 0.023 20.007
(0.073) (0.071) (0.115)
Years on the team 20.006 20.012 20.026
(0.014) (0.013) (0.025)
Years in first division 0.001 0.002 20.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018)
Age 20.009 20.003 0.014
(0.010) (0.009) (0.016)
Coach: New to the team 20.008 0.003 0.094
(0.028) (0.027) (0.098)
Replaced during the season 20.016 0.012 0.134**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.059)
Years on the team 20.011 20.009 0.055*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.033)
Years in first division 0.007** 0.007** 20.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
Age 0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Match: Injured players 20.010** 20.006 20.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Disqualified players 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.072***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Home play 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.140***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Opponent: Log(average pay) 20.042*** 20.043*** 20.048***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(pay dispersion index) 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Fraction of new players on the team 0.035 0.058 0.120**
(0.056) (0.057) (0.058)
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manager has a budget balance and he considers two alternatives
that do not alter average pay: in plan A, the top player earns three
times the average pay, and each remaining player earns 0.8 times
the average pay; in plan B, the top player earns two times the
average pay, and each remaining player earns 0.9 times the
average pay. The corresponding Theil index goes from an initial
level of T=0.083 to either T=0.137 in plan A or T=0.040 in
plan B.
We know from Table 6 that an increase in player’s pay has a
positive effect on individual performance, while an increase in pay
dispersion has a negative effect. As a result, the direction of the
effect on the top player is unclear a priori, while we already know
that in plan A the performance of the lower-paid players will fall,
and in plan B their performance will rise. With these numbers we
find that, in plan A the SIPA of the top player will rise by 0.015
points, whereas the SIPA of each other player will fall by 0.046
points. In plan B, the SIPA of the top player will rise by 0.003
points (notwithstanding a reduction of his pay), while the SIPA of
each other player will rise by 0.064 points. All in all, the effect on
the top player is lower than that on the other players. Considered
along with the fact that there is just one top player, but 10 other
players, this suggests that plan B is preferable, because it increases
the average SIPA by 0.058 points; in contrast, plan A reduces the
average SIPA by 0.04 points.
Conclusions
Relatively little is known about how the introduction of
dispersed pay in teams influences team performance. However,
teams are becoming increasingly widespread in organizations [42–
43]. The same is true for performance-contingent pay on the
individual level [44]. In fact, firms introduce dispersed pay in
teams [45–46], but the effect of this managerial intervention on
team performance has thus far been unclear. The broader
literature on pay dispersion in organizations has resulted in very
different, even contradictory, findings. In fact, the extant research
suggests that the effect of pay dispersion on organizational
performance can be positive, null, or negative [47].
In this study we collected and analyzed a unique dataset of
matches played during two seasons of the men’s major soccer
league in Italy. This unique dataset allows us to measure the effect
of pay dispersion according to different definitions of team. This
peculiarity of our dataset is the crucial element that can explain
the conflicting evidence. Indeed, we also find positive, null, and
negative effects of pay dispersion on team performance, using the
Table 6. Cont.
(1) (2) (3)
Method: Pooled OLS RE GLS FE OLS
Years on the team 20.001 0.003 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Years in first division 0.004 0.005 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Age 0.007 0.007 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant 5.443*** 5.217*** 7.126***
(0.308) (0.276) (1.521)
+ time dummy variables on month and year of the match
R2 0.041 0.040 0.000
Rho coefficient 0.063 0.380
Test pooled vs. panel 276.810 1.930
[0.000] [0.000]
Note: 8,226 observations on 876 players (on average, 9.39 matches per player). The dependent variable is the average SIPA from three newspapers. Standard errors are given





Figure 4. Predicted SIPA, by pay dispersion. Note: Predictions are
based on the average explanatory variables and the parameter
estimates from Table 6, column (3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112631.g004
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same data but different definitions of team. However, when we
take the narrowest definition of a team—considering only the
members who actually took part in the task and how long they
played—pay dispersion has a detrimental impact on team
performance: doubling pay dispersion decreases by 6% the
probability of winning a match. This result is consistent with
several robustness checks.
This negative effect of pay dispersion on team performance may
be the reason why salaries are usually kept secret within a firm
[48]. Employees do not like to earn less than their coworkers; as a
result, pay dispersion can decrease cooperation within the team
and it may affect individual performance. We investigate this issue
in our environment by looking at the number of passes within a
match and the (subjective) individual performance assessments
reported by the three most important Italian sports newspapers.
Our results show that higher pay dispersion has a detrimental
impact on individual evaluations, whereas it does not have a
significant effect on cooperation.
Our results hold for any level of pay given the dimensionless
nature of our pay dispersion index. Therefore, the external validity
of our analysis goes beyond this specific sports environment.
Actually, the fact that in the sport environment salaries can be
high is a strong feature of our dataset, because it allows us to study
a large variety of pay dispersions.
One limitation of our analysis is that the association between
pay dispersion and team performance is really driven by
underlying differences in players skills, abilities and talents and
that such differences cause both pay dispersion and team
performance. We cannot resolve this issue, given our data. The
proper way to address it arguably is by means of an experimental
research design that allows the experimentalist to control talent-
related as well as pay-related variables. We hope our study will
inspire future research into this issue.
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